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1Corruption is understood here to mean the misuse of the powers of government by elected and appointed
government employees for material gain. For a general introduction to the literature on corruption, see the anthology edited by
Heidenheimer, et al. (1989). For a theoretical discussion of the impact of corruption on growth, see Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
(1993); for an empirical cross country comparison of the impact of corruption, see Mauro (1995).
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INTRODUCTION
Government corruption is common in many new democracies in the developing and post-Soviet
worlds and is not unknown in older, established democracies, including the United States. Government
corruption is blamed for slowing economic growth and exacerbating inequality by inflating taxes and extra-
legal exactions, distorting private markets, and preventing governments from providing public goods
efficiently and in sufficient quantity.
1 Corruption in democracies is often embedded in patronage based
political institutions — large, hierarchical political parties, organized in many cases along ethnic or clan
lines, in which political support is bought with material rewards such as access to government jobs and
services. Today such political institutions exist in polities as diverse as the national governments of India,
Japan, Mexico, and Italy and the city governments of Istanbul and Moscow, and are still active in sub-
national U.S. governments, including the “outer boroughs” of New York City: Queens, Brooklyn and the
Bronx (Newfield and Barrett 1988). A patronage based political party, in American parlance a “political
machine,” is apparently able to insulate corrupt elected officials from voter ire by buying votes — granting
favors to and making individual deals with a winning coalition of voters. Understanding the structure and
impact of government corruption in democracies depends on understanding the political machine.
American city government at the turn of the twentieth century provides an unparalleled opportunity
to study how the ability to buy votes relaxes the constraints that voters otherwise impose on their
government. At the beginning of the twentieth century, city governments in many, but not all, cities in the
U.S. were dominated by large, well-organized, and well-documented, political machines. In this paper I2In other work I have addressed the internal structure of the machine, the causes of machine politics, and the
distortions that machine politics introduces into the private economy (Menes 1994, 1997).
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investigate how the ability to buy votes relaxes, or fails to relax, the constraints on politicians to keep taxes
and expenses down and to provide public goods.
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There were about 100 cities with populations greater than 50,000 in 1910. These cities were small,
open economies in the U.S. national economy, competing with each other and subject to similar (although
not identical) legal, cultural, and economic constraints. Unlike modern U.S. cities, the Progressive era
municipalities were fiscally independent, raising their own revenues from local taxes and bonds and
determining their own budgets. The performance of local governments mattered. In 1902 local
governments generated 55% of all government revenue and spent 59% of all government outlays,
compared to 22% and 25% today (Wallis 1993). The roads, sewers, schools, transportation, electricity, gas
and water provided by local governments or by government franchisees were vital to the health, wealth,
and happiness of residents. Between 1903 and 1931 data on city government performance, fiscal and real,
were collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Although no one collected an official list of political
machines, I am able to develop a subjective measure of the presence of a political machine based on the
rich historical literature on Progressive era cities. Using my coding of cities and the Census information I
compare government performance in machine dominated and non-machine dominated cities, including the
per capita government budget, overall and by department, the wages of government employees, and the
provision of one the most important and costly types of public infrastructure, the proportion of roads paved
with durable stone, brick, and asphalt paving. The proportion of durable paving on city roads provides a
measure of something notoriously difficult to measure — the government’s success in producing real public
goods.3
The historical literature does not provide a satisfactory theoretical model of the relationship
between machine politics and government performance. Instead I develop a game theoretic model of vote
buying and government behavior in a small open economy democracy. The model is influenced by rational
choice models of government such as Mançur Olson’s stationary bandit, Shleifer and Vishny’s kleptocratic
bureaucrats, and median voter and Tiebout models of democracy in local government (Olson 1991;
Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Tiebout 1956).
In the historical literature the study of machine governments as providers of public goods has been
overshadowed by the study of those aspects of government that appeared unique to the machine system,
such as patronage, the development of personal political networks, the demands of poor voters for material
rewards, and the costs of maintaining the internal hierarchy of the machine (Forthal 1946; Merton 1957;
Reid and Kurth 1992; Wilson 1961, among others). There are a few scholars who have addressed the
relationship between political machines and the performance of the more traditional responsibilities of local
government. In a field as intensively investigated as Progressive era urban politics most important
questions have at least been asked. The debate on the link between machine politics and public goods,
however, is still relatively undeveloped. The leading hypothesis is historical rather than theoretical and it
has not been carefully tested. Samuel Hays, in his influential 1964 article on the “Politics of Reform” argued
that machine dominated governments must have been poor providers of public goods because the
opponents of the political machines had higher demands for public goods than did machine supporters.
Large quantities of qualitative evidence support the conclusion that political reform was popular among
middle and upper-middle class voters, whereas patronage-based machines were supported by lower and3See Hays (1964), Hofstadter (1962), and Rice (1977) on the nature of reformers, Gosnell ([1937] 1968), Merton
(1957), Rice (1977), Reid and Kurth (1992), and Scott (1969) on the role of machines in the lives of poorer voters.
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lower-middle class voters.
3 Although less well established, it is likely that machine opponents (“reformers”)
and machine supporters did differ in the relative importance they attached to public goods and to private
favors. The rich probably did want public goods such as parks, roads, and museums, while the poor valued
individual favors, such as a bushel of coal or a job (Merton 1957). From the presumed pattern of demand
Hays argued that machine dominated city governments must have spent much of the city budget on private
favors and minimized spending on public goods and services, especially on the public infrastructure
demanded disproportionately by the middle-class and the rich, while reform-dominated governments must
have reduced spending on favors and built more infrastructure.
Hays’ thesis may be true, or false (my empirical analysis suggests that Hays’ thesis fails), but
whether true or false the theory is not a model of patronage politics and policy outcomes. The relationship
between favors and public goods which Hays proposes is not different from standard theories of voting,
where the demands of different voters determine outcomes. Hays’ thesis can be considered as a null
hypothesis — patronage and vote buying did not matter, only the demands of the voters in the winning
coalition — against which to test a theory of patronage.
Between 1890 and 1920 cities were providing increasing quantities of new or improved public
goods, including water systems, sewer systems, bridges, and paving (Cain and Rotella 1990; Rauch
1995). Jon Teaford’s study of national trends in both political organization and government performance,
the charmingly titled Unheralded Triumph, does much to advance the argument that American cities, both
machine dominated and non-machine, adapted to rapid growth and technological change with enviable
speed and flexibility (Teaford 1984). American city governments often provided new public goods more5
quickly and in greater quantity than municipal governments in England and Germany, both countries
whose professional, civil service dominated city governments were viewed by American political reformers
as models of urban reform. Teaford does not explicitly compare machine and non-machine cities, but
according to his analysis many of the larger cities were dominated by political machines and were among
the first to introduce the new public goods. Teaford does address the relationship between patronage and
performance within particular city administrations, showing that patronage-dependent politicians in many
cities employed patronage techniques to staff the city council, administration, courts, and police, where the
value of political loyalty was high and the technical demands on employees were low, but adopted merit
driven policies and careful attention to professional preparation in departments such as water, fire, and
highways, where new technologies demanded new technical skills. Teaford’s findings are neither a model
nor a theory; they describe empirical regularities that suggest Hays’ analysis may not be complete.
In this paper I analyze the effect of patronage politics on the costs and performance of municipal
government. The paper has four sections: a model, a discussion of the historical data against which the
model is tested, an empirical analysis of government wages, budgets, and public goods provision, and a
conclusion. Patronage politics does change government behavior. According to the model vote buying
relaxes some of the constraints on a government. A kleptocratic administration uses private vote-buying to
purchase the acquiescence of a majority of voters and then to extract rents from a (presumably protesting)
minority. The presence and the fiscal effect of machine politics is found empirically, as well. I observe a
higher government wage premium, presumably a reflection of vote buying through patronage jobs, and
higher budgets, presumably a reflection of the fiscal burden of patronage and corruption, in the machine-
dominated cities. According to the model, however, and unlike Hays’ prediction, the ability to buy votes
does not relax the motivation to provide public goods. The ability of voters to leave the city, not the ability of6
voters to vote, is what determines the level of the government’s provision of public goods in a city. I test the
provision of public goods using the provision of durable paving on city streets. Durable paving, as opposed
to dirt or gravel paving, was a valuable, expensive, and relatively uncommon, public good in 1910. I find the
machine dominated cities provide as much, or more, durable paving as non-machine dominated cities.
1. MACHINE POLITICS: MODEL AND IMPLICATIONS
Patronage, or machine, politics is the politics of private transactions between voters and politicians.
Votes are “bought” in exchange for government provided favors. A non-machine politician is unable to
make private deals and depends solely on policy-based appeals, such as tax rates and the provision of
public goods, to win elections. (The machine politician does not eschew policy based appeals; he
combines a public policy platform with private favors.)
In this section I model how vote buying relaxes the constraints on an elected government. I start
with a median voter model. The provision of public goods is the policy issue of concern to voters. I add the
option of buying votes with private payoffs, loosening the constraint on the winning politician to provide the
median voter’s preferred policy. I borrow the kleptocrat from Mancur Olson’s stationary bandit model of
government: machine politicians want to maximize the profits from political control, or the total tax revenue
less the costs of providing public goods (Olson 1991). Finally, because I am predicting the performance of
city, not national, governments, I introduce elements of a Tiebout model: city residents leave if they can do
better elsewhere, taking taxes, wages, and access to the public good into account. However I first solve the
model in the non-Tiebout setting, where voters cannot leave, to show which results are driven by vote
buying, and which by voter mobility. The closed border model can be interpreted as a machine government
in a country, able to close borders, or in a city with extremely low wages outside the city. If economic7
opportunities are sufficiently limited outside the city then city residents will respond to high taxes not by
leaving, but by changing the economic choices they make within the city. The last description may capture
the economic choice facing city residents in a developing country, where the rural wage is extremely low
and there is a large, untaxed and unregulated “informal” economy within the city.
1.1 The models
 Model 1: voters cannot leave the city
Consider a single city with N residents, each with one vote. There are two employment
opportunities in the city: a high wage market sector and a low wage domestic sector. Only workers in the
market sector are taxed. All city residents enjoy access to a city provided public good, G. The public good
is produced by a constant returns to scale technology and therefore G can also be expressed in terms of
the numeraire output. The utility function of a city resident has the form:
Ui = w ! t + pi + ui(G) (1)
where w = wage;
t = per capita tax if the worker is in the market sector, 0 otherwise;
pi = the private favor a voter receives from the machine government;
ui(G) = the utility derived from public goods, dui/dG > 0, d
2ui/dg
2 < 0.
The first order conditions for G
*, the socially optimal quantity of public good, are:
Marginal Cost of G
* = ÓN dui/dG
* (2)
such that the tax rate needed to pay for G





All voters derive identical utility from the public good, G; ui(G) = u(G) for all i. By construction the marginal4 In this specification all voters are identical. The model may be extended by allowing wages or demand for G to vary
across voters. Such an extension does not alter the implications of this model, but does produce interesting hypotheses
concerning the conditions which favor the development of machines (Menes 1997).
5Changing the political alternative changes the vote price, pi, but does not the amount of public good produced by a
machine politician in either the closed (model 1) or open (model 2) city. The kleptocratic patronage politician provides public
goods to lower the cost of buying the election and to increase the sustainable tax rate, not to match competing politicians.
Changing the quality of the political opposition will change the vote price, pi, in both models.
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cost of G is 1, and by symmetry du/dG is the same for all city residents, therefore:
4
du/dG
* = 1/N (3a)
and
t
* = G/N (3b)
provided G/N # w
market ! w
domestic, a constraint which need not bind.
The city is run by a single elected official, the mayor. There are two kinds of politicians who can run
for mayor, machine and non-machine. Non-machine politicians control two policy instruments: a tax, t,
which is the same for all inhabitants of the city, and the quantity of public goods, G. Machine politicians
control t and G and are also able to offer each voter a private transfer pi, the price of a vote. In theory the pi
can be either positive or negative, although in this model with identical voters the pi are always positive or
zero.
To make it as difficult as possible for the machine candidate to win, I assume the non-machine
candidate credibly offers the policy (t
*,G
*) that optimizes social welfare. The assumption captures the
intuition that there is free entry into politics by non-machine candidates and therefore the winning candidate
will offer the median voter’s preferred level of public goods.
5 The machine candidate, on the other hand, will
offer the combination (t
machine, G
machine, {pi}) that maximizes the revenue extracted from the city. Therefore the
machine has as its objective function:
MaxG,t,p t@N ! G ! 3N pi . (4)
The first constraint on the machine is that (.5N + 1) of the voters, the machine supporters, must be at least6 This formulation assumes that ballots are secret. By 1900 most cities had adopted the secret, or Australian ballot.
While machine politicians could at times circumvent the secret ballot for certain voters, stuffing ballot boxes and following voters
into the voting booth also absorbed machine resources. The ability to observe votes will lower the price paid for a vote because
each voter knows his vote is unlikely to be the marginal vote. A voter will be willing to sell his vote for less than the true value of
his preference for the optimal candidate over the machine candidate if the machine can observe the vote; if the machine cannot
observe the vote the voter will take the payment, and then vote his own best interest. In model 1 the ability to observe voters in
the voting booth would lower the provision of public goods, but it would not in model 2.
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as happy with the machine as they would be with the candidate offering the socially optimal package of
taxes and public goods:
6
w ! t + p + u(G) $ U
*. (5)
The second constraint on the machine is that the workers must stay in the taxable market sector. Too high






The above constraint will bind for a kleptocrat. Comparing eq. (6) with eq. (3b) reveals that, as expected,
the kleptocratic machine imposes a higher tax on residents than is socially optimal.
Solving eq. (6) for t and substituting into eq. (5), solving eq. (5) for the pi (treating all pi greater than
zero as equal by symmetry and dropping the subscript), and substituting for p in the machine objective
function, eq. (4), reduces the machine objective function to:
MaxG (.5N+1)@u(G) ! G. (7)
The first order condition for the maximization is:
du/dG
machine = 1/(.5N+1). (8)
Comparing eq. (8) with eq. (2) shows that du/dG
machine is larger than du/dG
* for any value of N greater than
2, which means, since d
2u/dG
2 < 0, that G
machine < G
*. The winning machine candidate offers less than the
socially optimal quantity of public goods at a higher than socially optimal tax rate.7 The presence of cities in the hinterland does not alter the fundamental conclusions of this model as long as each city
resident is located in the city where he receives the highest utility. If two cities are perfect substitutes for their residents then a
machine candidate cannot extract any revenue from the city, cannot pay for votes, and does not win the election.
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Model 2: voters can leave the city
Everything remains as in the first case except that the untaxed sector is moved out of the city into a
rural hinterland; w
domestic is now called w
rural. Neither taxes nor public goods are found in the rural hinterland.
7
Changing the economy changes the winning machine platform to G
machine = G
*; the machine politician now
provides the optimal quantity of public goods. Taxes are still higher than the voters would prefer. Intuitively,
the city government uses access to the public good, G, to keep voters in the city (and hence in the taxable
sector.) The revenue extracted by the city government is maximized when the utility of living in the city is
maximized. The kleptocrat therefore solves the same problem as a social welfare maximizing politician. Of
course taxes are higher in the machine city than they would be with a social welfare maximizing
government; the machine politician taxes away the extra utility that voters gain from higher city wages and
city public goods, returning only enough in private favors to “buy” the election.
Formally, the machine objective function remains eq. (4). The first constraint, on the voters who
sell their votes, remains eq. (5). The second constraint, on the voters who are exploited by the machine, is
the constraint that changes:
w ! t + u(G) $ w
rural. (9)




Solving eq. (9) for t and substituting the solutions for p and t, the objective function reduces to:




Because everything in braces, {·}, is a constant, the first order condition for maximizing the machine's
objective function is:11
du/dG = 1/N. (12)
The solution for G is the quantity G
* which optimizes social welfare, the same solution as that of the ideal
candidate. The machine government produces the socially optimal quantity of public goods, G
*. Overall
voter utility is lower than optimal because the machine still imposes a higher tax rate than is optimal.
1.2 Comparative Statics and Implications of the models
The construction of the models naturally suggests comparing the outcomes for politicians and for
voters in the two types of cities, closed and open borders, holding constant the wage in the untaxed sector
(w
domestic in the city with closed borders, model 1, equal to w
rural in the city with open borders, model 2). The
comparison between a closed and an open city is somewhat misleading, however. If w
domestic in a closed city
is equal to w
rural in an open city then the voters do better in the closed city and the politicians do better in the
open city, but it would be incorrect to assume that politicians in a particular city would ever choose to open
a closed border. A more illuminating comparative static is to consider combining the two models in a single
city so that all three options are available to a city resident: work in the taxed market sector at a wage
w
market, work in the untaxed domestic sector within the city at a wage w
domestic, and work outside the city in
the untaxed rural sector at a wage w
rural. When all three options are available, if w
rural = w
domestic, then model
1, the closed border city, is the applicable model. Since utility in the rural sector is equal simply to the wage,
w
rural, but utility in the domestic sector is equal to the wage plus the utility derived from access to whatever
public goods are available in the city, w
domestic + u(G
machine), when taxed too high a city resident would rather
enter the domestic sector than leave the city.
If we carry out the thought experiment of holding conditions in the city constant and raising the
rural wage it is relatively straightforward to discover that migration in response to high taxes does not




machine =8These comparative statics suggest why one should be hesitant to apply the relatively sanguine results of the analysis
— that patronage in Progressive era American cities did not suppress the production of public goods — to either national
government or to city governments in modern developing countries. In a country with a clearly dominant single city (often the
capital) and an extremely low rural wage the legal opportunity to leave the city is not a binding economic constraint because
options in the untaxed informal city economy will equal or exceed rural wages. Patronage dependent municipal governments in
countries where options outside the city are extremely unpromising will provide some public goods, in order to lower the cost of
buying elections, but they will provide less than the socially optimal quantity.
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in the rural wage will induce the patronage politician to increase the provision of G sufficiently to keep the
“domestic” and “rural” options equally attractive. It follows that as the rural alternative improves the utility of
city residents rises and the utility of politicians falls. For w
rural above [w
domestic + u(G
*)] the machine politician
no longer finds it cost effective to compensate for increased attractiveness of emigration by producing more




*) then there are no locational





*) the city itself is no longer viable — all residents leave to seek rural jobs.
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2. THE HISTORICAL RECORD AND THE PRESENCE OF A MACHINE.
2.1 Finding the machines
The model implies that in a machine dominated city we should observe an effective but expensive
government: good provision of public goods, but higher taxes and spending, and private payoffs to a large
number of voters. To test the model against the experience of American cities during the Progressive era it
is necessary to determine which city governments were, and which were not, dominated by political
machines. There is no objective variable which can be used to identify a machine dominated government.
Instead I have borrowed a technique from modern international comparisons of the impact of corruption —
the use of subjective estimates of the level of corruption in different countries. For modern studies, scholars
generally use measures developed to guide investors (Mauro 1995). For early twentieth century cities I9Political machines varied in their stability. Internal coups were a constant threat to every boss (Brown and Halaby,
1984, 1987). I have previously explored the costs of maintaining internal cohesion and the conditions which favor machine
development (Menes 1994, 1997). It was also possible for several competing machines to exist simultaneously in a city.
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have assembled a subjective measure of machine presence, based on primary sources and on the
extensive secondary literature on urban Progressive era politics (Menes 1997).
The early twentieth century urban political machine was a large and visible political institution with
a recognizable structure. Three elements can be identified without which the political machine could not
function: 1) a "boss," who coordinated the machine's activities in winning elections, paying off members,
and running the government; 2) machine "employees," mainly city employees organized into a
geographically based hierarchy, who provided favors to voters and collected votes; and 3) election
victories based on providing goods and services to individual voters in exchange for votes. The machine
structure was determined by the technological demands of vote buying. The machine offered favored
voters a range of goods and services, such as jobs, dismissal of a minor infraction of the law, or help with
the rent and a scuttle of coal in an emergency (Forthal 1946, among others). The machine structure, with a
boss and a large hierarchy of local politicians, was required because providing favors to individual voters in
face-to-face exchanges is a labor intensive political technology. The number of votes that any single
politician can purchase is limited by the number of voters he can personally know, a number in the
thousands even for the best politicians. Control of the city requires tens or hundreds of thousands of votes.
Many local politicians must agree to form an alliance in order to win the election. The machine is the
organization designed to put together a stable alliance of many local politicians, allowing them to combine
their information on voter preferences to win elections. The hierarchical structure of the machine,
dominated by a boss who acts as a deal-maker and power-broker between the individual local politicians,
divvying up the responsibilities and the spoils, is intended to limit the natural tendency of the politicians to
renegotiate the terms of any political alliance.
9 For my purposes the structure of the machine has theCompeting machines could control different parts of a decentralized city government in a de facto truce ( the relationship
between New York’s Tammany Hall, the dominant Manhattan based machine, and rival machines based in Brooklyn and the
Bronx) or could alternate in control of the city (the rival machines of Boston). As long the competing machines fulfilled the
minimum requirements established in this paper I code the city as a machine dominated city.
10 A complete list of the cities, with thumbnail sketches of the political histories, can be found in appendix B. AlthoughI
found the histories of 44 cities, I omit two of these cities from the empirical analysis: Washington DC, as it was not a
democracy; and San Francisco, CA, as the effects of the 1906 earthquake dominate the effects of political structure on
government performance.
11 Including cities with population between 30,000 and 50,000 would improve most of the empirical results slightly.
Both spending and the provision of durable paving was smaller in the smallest cities.
14
advantage that such a large political institution was impossible to conceal.
I am able to identify as either "machine dominated" or "known non-machine" the political structure
of 44 of the American cities with populations greater than 50,000 in 1900.
10 To identify a political
organization as a machine I had to be able to identify the boss, determine that he gave his political
supporters government jobs, and determine that in turn these supporters formed a geographically based
network which provided private favors to voters. A number of urban machines emerged during the late
1890s and a significant fraction declined or broke up during or immediately after World War I, making the
20 years from 1900-1920 a natural period to use to identify stable machine organizations. I required that
the organization survive at least ten years. To identify a city as machine dominated I had to determine that
the city government was largely controlled by a political machine, or several political machines in
competition, for at least ten of the twenty years between 1900 and 1920. To identify a city as non-machine I
had to determine that political leaders who did not receive important support from patronage-based
organizations controlled the city for more than ten years between 1900 and 1920. I limit the sample to cities
greater than 50,000 in population because I did not find a city below 50,000 with a machine dominated
government.
11 Table 1 presents the regional breakdown of the sample of cities.
I have previously investigated the relationship between the characteristics of cities and the
presence of a machine (Menes 1997). Several conclusions from the previous work are relevant to the15
present analysis. Machine presence is strongly related to city size — machines develop in the biggest
cities — and machine presence is weakly related to the proportion of the population made up of the adult,
male children of the foreign born — machines develop in cities with large populations of native born
“ethnics.” However these are the only two of a large number of characteristics traditionally linked to
machine presence for which I could find a statistically significant relationship. Neither the proportion of the
population made up of the foreign born nor the importance of manufacturing helps predict the presence of a
machine. Machines are also found in all regions of the country except the far West and are found in
predominantly Democratic and predominantly Republican communities. Patronage politics appears to have
been a flexible political technology, adaptable to a wide range of conditions.
2.2 The empirical implications of the missing cities
I have been able to categorize 24 cities as known machine dominated and 18 cities as known non-
machine dominated, but there are 64 cities for which I did not find a good political history spanning the
years 1900-1920. During my research it became clear that the cities for which I found political histories
were not a random sample of cities. Three factors appeared to predict whether or not I would find a city
history: the size of the city (I found large cities), whether or not the years 1900-1920 were a period of
economic and demographic growth (I found rapidly growing cities), and whether or not a stable political
regime, often a single successful politician, controlled the city government during the years 1900-1920 (I
found cities with stable governing regimes). I am not particularly concerned about the selection bias thus
introduced into the sample of machine dominated cities. I was trying to find as many of the stable dominant
machines as possible. I also explicitly searched the historical literature for references to “machines” and
“bosses.” However I know that the sample of known non-machine cities is not representative of non-
machine cities in general. The known non-machine sample is dominated by large, rapidly growing cities16
(factors I can and do control for in the regressions), and by cities presided over by popular, successful non-
machine politicians, including several famous “reformers.” The known non-machine cities appear to be
disproportionately cities with stable and popular governments, which is not a factor I can control for and
which is expected to correlate positively with the provision of public goods.
One solution to the problem would be to combine the known non-machine cities and the cities with
unknown political histories into a single group and compare the combined sample to the known machine
dominated cities. However if I keep the three samples distinct I can turn the biases between the known
non-machine and unknown cities to empirical advantage. I do not expect either the known non-machine
cities or the unknown cities to show systematic evidence of widespread patronage. A good proxy for
patronage therefore should behave the same in the non-machine sample and the unknown sample, and be
smaller in both samples than in the known machine cities. I do expect the known non-machine cities and
the unknown cities to perform differently as producers of public goods. I expect the popular and long-lasting
non-machine regimes to provide approximately the optimal quantity of public goods, while the presumably
less popular, less stable unknown regimes will provide too small a quantity of public goods. Comparing the
provision of public goods in the machine dominated cities to the known non-machine cities and the
unknown cities separately provides a rough test of the prediction that the production of public goods in a
machine dominated city will be socially optimal. I expect the known non-machine cities and machine
dominated cities to produce similar quantities of public goods.
Technically, I include all three samples in the regression analysis by defining two dummy variables.
The first dummy variable identifies a city as either a known political machine or otherwise. The second
dummy divides the remaining sample into known non-machine cities and unknown (uncoded) cities.
Statistically, it doesn’t matter how I define the second dummy (which sample is given the dummy value of 1
and which of 0) but for ease of interpretation of the coefficient on the machine sample I switch dummy17
definitions between the analysis on city spending (government wages and budgets) and on the provision of
public goods. In the analyses of wages and budgets I compare the machine dominated cities and the
unknown cities to the known non-machine cities — which are the cities I expect to show the fewest signs of
patronage. In the analysis of durable paving I compare the machine dominated and the known non-
machine cities to the unknown cities — which are the cities I expect to produce the lowest proportions of
durably paved streets.
3. MACHINE POLITICS AND MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE
I propose that the behavior of Progressive era patronage based American urban government is
best predicted by model 2, the model of the patronage dependent government with a footloose tax base. I
assume that the non-machine governed cities are ruled by something that can be roughly approximated by
the median voter model. I examine three categories of government performance that together provide a
test of model 2 against alternative theories and produce minimum estimates of the burden patronage
politics imposed on residents in machine-dominated cities. The three choice variables in the model are the
vote price, pi, the tax level, t (which may include legal and extra-legal exactions), and the level of public
goods provision, G. Although there is no record of all the private favors, all the bribes and kickbacks, or
even all the public goods provided by any city government, all three variables are reflected in observable
government behavior. I use three measures of government performance, the wages of unskilled municipal
employees, the city budget, and the proportion of streets paved with durable paving, as proxies for the
three choice variables.
There are three alternative theories against which I am testing model 2. The first alternative theory
is the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the cities I have identified as machine and those
that are either non-machine or whose political structure is unknown. The second alternative theory is Hays’12For example, a survey of 600 precinct captains, the lowest official rank in the political hierarchy of the machine, in
three separate machine organizations active in Chicago around the mid 1920s found that 70% of the precinct captains held
government jobs (Forthal 1946).
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thesis that machine politicians gave their supporters what they wanted, private favors, pi, while “reform”
politicians (machine opponents) responded to their constituencies by producing more public goods, G.
(The Hays’ thesis does not provide an a priori estimate of the difference in taxes, t, between the two types
of cities.) The third alternative is that the machine cities are more like model 1, patronage in a city with a
fixed tax base. The second and third alternatives are empirically indistinguishable from each other. Both
predict that machine politics will lead to positive payoffs to voters, pi, and to a lower quantity of public
goods, G. Both alternatives, however, can be distinguished from my proposed model, model 2. Model 2
predicts that the production of public goods, G, will be the same (or higher) in machine dominated cities
than in the non-machine cities.
3.1 Looking for p: Municipal wages and machine presence
I test for the presence of payoffs to machine supporters, positive pi, by examining the wages of city
employees in unskilled city jobs in 1909. Patronage jobs, government jobs given to political supporters,
were (and are) the lifeblood of patronage politics.
12 In order for a city job to have political value the recipient
of the job must prefer the government job to private sector opportunities. For many jobs the political
premium may be hard to discern. A city job can provide a political premium if an individual is hired for a job
he would not be able to obtain in the private sector. (The city does not necessarily hire unqualified workers;
some individuals may face discrimination in the private sector.) Jobs which include discretionary functions,
such as the work of policemen or inspectors, may pay the political premium by providing opportunities for
the patronage appointee to extract bribes from citizens, which will not be recorded. But for the large
number of city employees who worked at unskilled jobs — digging ditches, sweeping streets, and collecting13The other way to pay a bonus to an employee in an unskilled job is to let him shirk. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that machine governments did allow some shirking, which produces a downward bias on the observed wage premium in
machine cities.
14Patronage politics is not the only political structure in which city workers can be a political resource and hence
extract above market wages. However in 1909 there was little opportunity for city workers to develop independent political
power. Few unskilled workers had civil service protection and none were unionized; they served at the pleasure of elected
politicians or their appointed department heads.
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garbage — the political premium was likely paid by inflating wages.
13 Unskilled workers were an appealing
source of votes for machine politicians because their votes were likely the cheapest votes to buy. Unskilled
wages are an appealing place to look for the payoffs. There are few good non-political reason to overpay
unskilled city employees. The presence of a premium on municipal wages of unskilled workers is a proxy
for pi, the price of a vote.
14
Daily wages for several classes of municipal employees in five city departments (sewers, refuse
disposal, street cleaning, dust prevention, and general highways) can be obtained for cities with
populations greater than 30,000 in 1909. The summary statistics for the average daily wages reported for
unskilled laborers, by region and by city type for cities with populations greater than 50,000, are presented
in table 1. The machine cities paid more, on average, than the non-machine cities in all regions except New
England, (in which I found only one known non-machine city). The model, however, does not predict that
the absolute levels of municipal wages will be higher in machine cities. Rather, it indicates that the
municipal wage will be higher than the corresponding private sector wage in the same city. The proposition
is tested by regression analysis, controlling for the private wage rate in the city. The results are reported in
table 2. The log of the municipal wage paid to unskilled workers is regressed on proxies for the unskilled
wage paid in the private sector and on “machine” and “politically unknown” dummies. The functional form
tests for the wage premium as a percentage of the unskilled wage, which assumes the price of a vote is
linear in income. The region and the annual wage cost per full time employee in bakeries are used as15 Similar results are found using wages of employees in saw mills if the cities in the Pacific Northwest, where lumber
mills were both numerous and unusually large, are omitted.
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proxies for the private wage. Bakeries were found in all cities, the technology across cities was similar, and
the work of bakery employees (not owners) was relatively low skill.
15 Since bakeries employed women as
well as men, whereas the low skill workers employed by municipal departments were almost exclusively
men, the proportion of men in the bakery work force in each city is included as a regressor to control for the
difference in average labor costs in bakeries due to the different gender ratios in the bakery work force of
different cities. Population size and rate of population growth are included as regressors, both because
they are correlated with machine presence and because they may change the nature of the private labor
market, but neither appear to have had a significant impact on the municipal wage premium for unskilled
workers.
There are 105 cities (23 machine, 18 non-machine and 64 politically unknown) with populations
greater than 50,000 in 1910 for which both daily unskilled municipal wages and the annual wage per
employee in bakeries are reported. For each city, wages could be reported for unskilled workers in up to
five departments, for a potential total of 515 observations, but no city reported wages in all five
departments. The total number of city-wage observations is 388 and the regression is run on the full
sample of 388 wage rates, including dummy variables for the region and for the department reporting the
wage. The reported standard errors are White-corrected to correct for city effects. The regression results
shown in table 2 indicate that an unskilled municipal employee in a machine city received 8% more than he
would in an otherwise identical city without a machine government. If the municipal worker worked full time
then the annual subsidy received was roughly $50. Using two dummies to identify the city political structure
allows a comparison of both the machine dominated cities and of the unknown cities against the sample of
known non-machine cities. As expected, the difference between wages in politically unknown (uncoded)21
cities and the known non-machine cities (the omitted category) is not large and is not statistically
significant.
Although we reject the null hypothesis that machines did not exist, the wage premium is consistent
with all of the alternative theories of machine behavior, model 1 and the Hays thesis, as well as with my
proposed model, model 2. I also cannot determine from the regression analysis the true incidence of the
patronage wage premium. Did municipal employees in a machine city perform the city functions they were
hired to perform? What other services did they provide to city residents? If machine workers spent little of
their time on official work, the cost to the city taxpayers depended on the value of the work the machine
workers were doing instead. If the patronage employees were busy providing goods and services to their
neighbors in exchange for votes, then city residents as a whole were getting some value. If, on the other
hand, machine employees were busy gathering information about their neighbors that lowered the price the
machine paid for votes, the city residents were worse off. The machine politicians, particularly the boss,
were better off. In the next two sections I answer some of the questions raised by the existence of the
patronage premium. I find and test proxies for government costs and public goods provision that allow me
to distinguish amongst the alternative hypotheses. I leave for future study the question of who got and who
paid the patronage wage premium, observing only that $50 a year seems a plausible payoff for the political
allegiance of an unskilled man and his immediate family and friends.
3.2 Looking for t: Municipal budgets and machine presence
I turn now to look for evidence of increased costs, higher t, in the patronage dependent
governments. According to the predictions of both model 1 and model 2 a machine government imposes a
heavier financial burden on taxpayers than a non-machine government. The machine politicians are paying
to buy votes, paying to provide public goods, and stealing as much as possible without destroying the tax16There is one caveat to this conclusion. There were corrupt non-machine city governments, too. If all governments
used the same tactics to extract rents from citizens then corruption in non-machine cities biases down the empirical estimate of
the machine premium. However, if non-machine corruption was more likely to be off-budget (for example, more bribes for
changing building codes and fewer kickbacks on city contracts) then a higher premium on the municipal budget in machine
cities would not necessarily indicate that the corrupt machine cities were more costly than the corrupt non-machine cities. I have
no a priori reason to suspect this problem, but the possibility points out the importance of research into the techniques of
political graft.
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base. I use the per capita city budgets, total and by department, as proxies for government revenue, t.
Using the official budget as a measure of the cost of government biases the empirical work against finding
patronage-dependent costs. Many exactions, such as bribes paid to city politicians and bureaucrats or
profits made from dealing on insider information or from manipulating local markets through regulation,
never show up in the official budget (Menes 1997). Some of the cost inflation, however, will show up in the
budget, such as the funds needed to pay for patronage wage premiums and for inflated government
contracts. Therefore comparing city budgets provides a test biased against finding a machine effect and
produces a minimum estimate of the financial burden of the machine.
16 The OLS regressions of municipal
spending run on the cross section of cities, as shown on table 4, find the cities with machine dominated
governments spent 18% more per capita on municipal expenses, roughly $5.00 per city resident per year,
or about three days' wages for an unskilled worker, in the average machine city.
Simultaneity is a more serious problem for the analysis of city spending than for the analysis of
municipal wages. It is difficult to come up with alternative explanations for the wage premium — the
residents of a city never want to overpay city workers. But unobserved city characteristics might contribute
to differences in demand for city services and hence to differences in city budgets. These unobserved
variables might also be correlated with political structure. The optimal solution to the statistical problem
would be to use instruments for political structure that are not related to the supply or demand for city
services. Unfortunately it is unlikely that such instruments existed and even less likely that any were
recorded. However I can increase confidence in the conclusion that the apparent machine premium17 Current expenses are reported for a total of seven departments. The omitted departments are recreation and
miscellaneous. For neither of these divisions is the machine a statistically significant predictor of expenses, but neither do the
remaining regressors do not capture much of the variation in spending between cities in these departments.
18The point estimate of machine impact in the departments of health and sanitation is not statistically significant.
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observed in the city budget is due to machine presence by examining a breakdown of city spending by
department. Some municipal departments were better suited to patronage-dependent cost inflation than
others. As Teaford observes, patronage and corruption were concentrated in departments where the skill
of workers was the least important, where the elected officials controlled hiring directly, and where the
machine valued employing loyal workers. Departments where high skills were demanded, or where
important and technologically advanced public goods were produced, were likely to be spared patronage
appointments and sweet-heart contracts to unqualified contractors(Teaford 1984). It is unlikely that
unobserved variables would produce a pattern of demand for city services across the different departments
which would mimic the spending pattern induced by the demands of patronage. I do not argue that
bureaucratic professionals would never inflate costs but rather that they would do so more or less equally
across departments.
Tables 5 and 6 present OLS cross section regressions of average per capita spending on current
expenses in five separate departments: general administration, protection, health, highways, and
education.
17 The point estimate for the machine premium is largest in the departments of health and
sanitation (19.8%), protection (18.6%) and general administration (33.9%).
18 These estimates of machine
premia by department are consistent with the notion that machines raise the cost of city government
through patronage and theft, while leaving output of public goods unaffected. The large effect, 33.9%,
observed in the budget for general administration, suggests we are observing the effect of patronage hires
on the city budget. The mayor, the council members, and the judges were the machine. In general
administration they hired patronage workers directly, without having to go through the appointed head of24
another department. Many of the jobs were relatively unskilled, or at least required skills which had
traditionally been called for in government, such as legal training, not the new professional skills required of
civil engineers, certified teachers, or social workers. Control of the administration and of the courts was
also important to machine control because many of the activities of machine politicians were illegal. The
individuals working for the courts, for the mayor, and for the legislators observed the activities of machine
politicians most closely and had the primary responsibility for enforcing regulations and laws banning
corrupt practices. They would have been paid a hefty premium to ensure that they ignored their official
responsibilities. A similar argument may be made for the police department.
I expect the machine premium to be smaller, or non-existent, in the budgets of other departments.
The regressions indicate that the machine had little effect on current expenditures in the department of
highways and a negative effect, if anything, on spending on education, (the machine coefficient on
education spending is not statistically significant). Both school systems and highways departments were
adopting new technologies and expanding the kinds of goods and services provided to the public. Although
there were plenty of low-skilled jobs in schools and (especially) in highway departments, both departments
required educated, professional management, people selected for skills as much or more than for political
loyalty. I do not want to read too much into the negative point estimate on school spending. Some of the
real factors decreasing demand for public schools were positively related to machine presence — for
example, cities with a large proportion of native born Americans with foreign born parents were often cities
with large parochial school systems, which decreased the demand for public schools. But on the other
hand school systems were not particulary suited to patronage. In many cities the Board of Education was
an independent unit of government, with its own elected officials and often its own ability to levy taxes. A
machine that controlled the central government may or may not have controlled the Board of Education.
Many teachers were also unmarried women and in most cities women did not vote.19Difficulty in evaluating the performance of government plagues much of the research on urban government, not just
research on machine politics or corruption. See the review of the empirical Tiebout hypothesis literature by Keith Dowding,
Peter John and Stephen Biggs (1994).
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The analysis of city budgets confirms that not only did patronage exist but that it inflated taxes and
city spending. However it is still not possible to determine, from spending data, whether or not patronage
had an impact on the production of public goods.
3.3 Looking for G: Machine Presence and durable paving
Paving as a measure of public goods provision
The proportion of streets surfaced with durable paving, paving with asphalt, stone, or brick on a
concrete foundation, can be taken as a measure of the quantity of public goods provided to city residents.
The quantity and quality of many of the goods and services provided by local government might be
expected to provide measures of the provision of public goods, but in practice the production of public
goods is nearly as difficult to observe as outright graft, and harder to measure than the effects of patronage
employment.
19 We can measure inputs, the number of teachers or policemen, but it is harder to measure
the outputs, education and safety, and even harder to determine if variations between cities reflect
differences in costs, efficiency, or demand. Physical outputs are easier to measure, but today most cities
meet essentially all of the demands for physical infrastructure — all roads are paved, all residences are
connected to the city water and sewer systems. In the first decade of the twentieth century, however, there
was significant variation in the provision of measurable physical infrastructure. Of all of the new public
goods — water, sewers, street railways, high schools, ports, and bridges — the proportion of city streets
paved with durable paving provides the best measure of the success of local government at providing
public goods. Durable paving was costly, important to city residents, measurable, and measured, the result
of recent government decisions, a public, not private, good, provided only by government, and neither26
unusually resistant to nor unusually distorted by graft. In the average city only about 25% of all the streets
were paved with a durable surface material and there was considerable variation between cities (table 7).
And both demand and costs were in large part determined by city characteristics such as size, density, and
average wage rates that were observable, were observed, and can be controlled for in empirical analysis.
Streets have aspects of both public and private goods, but, as argued by Clay McShane, durable
paving was a largely public good in 1900 (1979). Durable paving had, for many city residents, the qualities
of a private bad. Commercial traffic, heavy wagons with thin, iron rimmed wheels, rapidly damaged dirt
roads and non-durable gravel or macadam paving. Commercial traffic was noisy, dirty and dangerous. In a
city in which most streets could not handle commercial wagons, upgrading the paving on a residential
street increased traffic flow through the city but decreased the quality of life for abutters by encouraging
teamsters to use the street. The conflict between public good and private bad is likely to have been
greatest in the densely populated residential neighborhoods close to the central business district, where
the street served as an important social and retail space. Row houses and tenement flats had little or no
open land of their own and much neighborhood activity occurred in the streets. If machines favored the
poorest voters over city-wide commercial interests they might be expected, as Hays predicted, to stint on
durable paving.
In the model the public good, G, is assumed to be a consumption good (like a park or library), but
paved roads are an intermediate input, not a consumption good. Hays does not distinguish between public
consumption goods and public intermediate inputs, he predicts that patronage dominated cities produced
less of both. The issue is only important if we are trying to distinguish between model 1 and model 2.
Although the productive sector is not explicitly modeled, a trivial extension of the models would show that in
an open city, model 2, a kleptocratic machine politician will provide the optimal quantity of all public goods,
both final consumption goods and intermediate goods, because they all have the same impact on the27
sustainable tax rate. The kleptocratic boss of a closed city, model 1, however, will treat some intermediate
input public goods differently from consumption public goods. If a public good is an input only into the
production of goods and services sold outside the city then the kleptocrat will provide the optimal quantity
of that public good. The export market plays the same role in extension of model 1 as the open boundary
and the movement of taxpayers does in the original version of model 2; anything that lowers the production
costs of an export good increases the tax that the government can levy on the producer without driving him
out of business. It therefore would be impossible to distinguish between model 1, a closed city, and model
2, an open city, if durable paving were purely an input into the production of export goods.
However the difference between intermediate input and final consumption good is not empirically
important for my analysis, for two reasons. First, distinguishing between model 1 and model 2 is not the
main purpose of the analysis. I know that labor could, and did, move freely into and out of American cities,
so I am relatively secure in the conclusion that model 2 is the appropriate model. I am more interested in
testing model 2 against alternatives found in the historical literature. Second, if I were concerned with
distinguishing between models 1 and 2, durable paving would be an appropriate test because it was not an
input into export goods in American cities during the year 1900-1910. It was in input into the production of
domestically consumed goods and services. Public goods which are inputs into domestically consumed
goods and services are theoretically indistinguishable from public consumption goods; they increase the
well-being of city residents but they only form part of the taxable sector if the residents can vote with their
feet.
Today it is impossible to determine the extent to which the road system is an input into locally
consumed goods compared to exported goods. Factories with national markets, supermarkets responding
to local demand, and commuters working for every sector in a city’s economy are all dependent on the
road system. However in 1900 or 1910 most of the demand for durably paved roads came from a much28
narrower economic sector — local retail trade. Most people moved on foot or by street-car. Goods moved
into and out of the city by rail, not on roads. Every factory of any size selling to national markets needed rail
access, not road access. The road system of a city did not link up to a national or even a statewide system
of roads, and if it had there were no trucks, only wagons drawn by horses or other draft animals. For
shipments between cities trains were cheaper. Consumer goods, food, ice, coal, clothes, furniture and all
the other physical demands of the urban household, however, moved within the city from wholesale
warehouse to store and from store to home in wagons pulled over city streets. Paved roads in 1900 were
intermediate inputs to the production of locally consumed goods and their provision had the same effect on
the taxpayer’s utility, and willingness to move, as did providing public consumption goods like parks and
libraries.
The proportion of streets with durable paving, not the overall mileage, is the best measure of
provision of paving to city residents. The total mileage of streets in a city was not a choice variable for the
city government. New streets were developed as city growth demanded. Most new streets, especially
residential streets, were unpaved or paved with a gravel pavement of some variety on a dirt foundation.
City characteristics, especially the population and density of the city, then determined what proportion of
the existing streets it would have been optimal to pave with durable surfacing.
The final assumption of the empirical work is that once I control for population, area, wealth, and
demographic characteristics of the city, the higher the proportion of city streets that are durably paved the
closer the city is to the optimal provision of paving — no cities are over-producing paving. Historically, the
explosion of the automobile and truck fleets during the second decade of the twentieth century ensured
that no city regretted a heavy investment in paving before 1910. It is possible, however, that some city
governments thought they were putting in too much durable paving, although even before the widespread
use of the auto the demand for paving was rising rapidly (McShane 1979). My concern is that the machine29
dominated city government may have been trying to over-invest in paving, because paving projects may
have been unusually well suited to graft. I should stress that there is no evidence that paving contracts
were more prone to graft than other forms of government spending, nor that it was necessary to do
excessive paving in order to pad paving contracts. (And there was an abundance of paving to be done.)
However it is good to have at least a rough test for the “optimality” of the quantity of paving in machine
dominated cities. Such a test is provided by the division of the sample of cities in which I did not find
machines into cities with known political histories and cities for which the political histories are not known.
As I have previously argued, if the machine cities are doing their best to provide the optimal levels of
paving they should resemble the known non-machine cities and both the machine cities and the known
non-machine cities should lead the mystery cities in proportion of durable paving. As can be seen in figure
1, it might at first appear that in fact the machine cities are providing too much paving. In raw proportions
they lead both other samples in the provision of paving. However, as we shall see in the regression
analysis, the apparent lead of the machine cities is entirely accounted for by their geographic location in the
older, colder Northeast and their larger population.
The provision of paving in cities
Figure 1 presents the provision of paving in the three samples of cities: machine, known non-
machine, and politically unknown. As shown, the machine cities paved a higher proportion of their streets,
over a third, than did the two other kinds of cities, with the known non-machine cities paving a little under a
quarter and the cities with unknown political structure paving less than a fifth of all of their street-miles.
Although the link between the proportion of paving and the services provided to city residents by the paving
is closer than with many other kinds of public infrastructure, weather, population, the physical size of the
city, the prevailing wage rate, and the age of the city affected both the supply of and the demand for20The cities in New England resisted durable paving for reasons I have not yet been able to track down in the
literature. Except for Boston, the New England cities depended largely on non-durable, gravel based paving. Because of the
regional difference between New England and the rest of the Northeastern states I omit the New England states from the sub-
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durably surfaced roads. In the regression analysis I control for a range of supply and demand shifters
(table 8). Although, as shown in the first regression, population and area of the city matter, the story told by
the regression analysis is not much different from the graphical analysis. The machine dominated cities are
paving about 11% more of their miles of roadways. As the sample average is only 23.5% of all roads
paved with durable paving, the machine cities are paving almost 50% more of their streets than the
average city. In the national sample the known non-machine cities lag the machine cities by a little over
4%, although the difference is not statistically significant.
The relationship between paving and machine presence in the national sample may reflect
relationships between machine presence and city characteristics that are also related to the provision of
paving. Two issues are of concern — non-linearities in the relationship between city size and machine
presence and differences in the supply and demand functions for paving related to the climate and age of
the city. The first graph and the results of the first regression may reflect the large number of very large
cities dominated by machine politics or the presence of a large number of machines in the older, colder
cities in the Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central census regions. To determine if such
differences alter paving provision the empirical analysis of paving is repeated three sub-samples, divided
by size and region. Because almost all the cities over 300,000 are machine dominated and these largest
cities might have unusually high demands for paving, I repeat the graphical and regression analyses on the
medium sized cities between 50,000 and 300,000. Because the machine form is most prevalent in the
cities of the Northeast where older cities and colder climates might be expected to increase the demand for
and provision of paving, I repeat the regression analysis on cities found in the Mid-Atlantic, East North
Central and West North Central.
20 Finally, I combine these two restrictions to examine the importance of thesample of “Northeastern” states, to confirm that the apparent effects are not driven by the New England cities. Including New
England cities would strengthen my conclusions. I present the results for regressions on sub-samples in order to show the
stability of the relationship of all variables to durable paving across size and region. It would not be incorrect to run these
regressions using regional dummies and ignoring the potential non-linearities in the effect of population size, although a priori
such a functional form might not have been appropriate.
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presence of a machine in the medium sized Northeastern cities. The regressions reported for all four
samples are extremely consistent. Population and area are the most important and significant predictors of
the demand for paving, and their impact does not seem to vary by region, or be significantly different in the
smaller cities. The consistency of the coefficients on the non-political regressors in all four samples
provides further support for the choice of durable paving as a basis of comparison of the provision of public
goods across cities.
The results on the political coefficients, machine and non-machine, are of the greatest interest. As
shown in table 8, the machine dominated city governments provide as much paving as the known non-
machine cities and considerably more paving than the cities whose political structure is not known. The
only significant change between the analysis of the national population of cities and the three sub-samples
is an improvement. The difference between the machine dominated and the known non-machine cities,
never statistically significant, basically disappears in the sub-samples. In the sample of medium sized
Northeastern cities the known non-machine cities actually provide the highest proportion of paving of all
three kinds of cities (although the difference is a statistically and economically insignificant 0.2%) In all
three sub-samples the known non-machine cities provide significantly more paving than the cities with
unknown political structure, both in the economic and in the statistical sense. As I have already argued,
stable and popular administrations, presumably honest and effective, tend to show up disproportionately in
the population of known non-machine city governments. It is reassuring that these known non-machine
cities perform, in the provision of durable paving, like the machine dominated cities.
The results support my theoretical framework, the second model with mobile taxpayer/voters, in32
comparison to either the Hays’ thesis or the first model, with an immobile tax base. The empirical analysis
suggests that machine dominated city governments produce the optimal quantity of durable paving, or at
least as close to optimal as the leading non-machine cities. If either the Hays’ thesis or model 1, with the
effectively immobile tax base, were correct then we would expect that the known non-machine cities would
provide a higher level of paving and the provision of paving in machine cities should resemble the provision
in the politically unknown cities, or worse. But machine politics, far from suppressing the provision of
durable goods, appears to encourage their provision. The presence of a machine appears to boost the
proportion of durable paving by more than 10% of all street surfaces compared to population of cities with
unknown political histories. Since the average proportion of paving is between 20% and 40% in all
samples, the residents in machine cities receive, all else held constant, a quarter to a half more paving. On
the other hand there is little evidence of too much paving. The machine cities are indistinguishable,
statistically, from the known non-machine cities. The conclusion, therefore, is exactly the implication
derived from the model: the machine cities are as generous as the “best” of the rest of the city governments
at providing public goods. They perform significantly better than the average city government.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
I have found that, despite the claims of contemporary political opponents and later scholars,
patronage politics in Progressive era American cities did not cripple the performance of government. There
is no evidence that patronage-ridden city governments underperformed non-machine dominated city
governments in the provision of at least one important public good, durable paving, and some evidence
that the machine cities outperformed the average city government. I do not, however, conclude that
corruption did not matter in American cities, nor that corruption does not distort economic and political
development in modern democracies. The inflated wages and budgets suggest that corruption did cost tax-33
payers, even if it did not distort the provision of public goods. Perhaps more important, the analysis, based
on the model and the empirical results, confirms that the effect of rent-seeking behavior depends on both
the political structure produced by patronage and on the economic and legal framework within which
patronage dependent politicians function. In American cities, open boundaries and high wages outside the
city combined to constrain kleptocratic governments, but for a patronage dependent national government,
or for city government embedded in a country with an extremely low rural wage, vote-buying might allow
the government to cut back on the provision of public goods.
I cannot conclude with a simple policy prescription for limiting the impact of corruption in modern
democracies, but the experience of American cities suggests that legal and economic constraints may be
as effective as political reform in controlling the burden that corruption places on an economy. This study of
American cities also suggests that rational choice models are effective tools for predicting possible
relationships between corruption and government performance and for producing testable hypotheses. The
results suggest that mobility and competition between political units can mitigate the impact of rent-seeking.
The results imply an additional explanation why open borders appear, empirically, to encourage economic
growth. Classical economic theory predicts that free trade leads to efficient use of inputs. Modern work
predicts that the competition engendered by free trade also limits monopoly and encourages innovation in
the private sector. This study proposes a third possible mechanism for the role of open borders in
encouraging economic growth — movement of inputs and outputs across political boundaries may
encourage venal governments to behave better.34
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TABLE 1— AVERAGE DAILY MUNICIPAL WAGES OF UNSKILLED WORKERS (IN DOLLARS)
CITIES WITH POPULATION GREATER THAN 50,000 IN 1910

































































Notes: 105 cities with population greater than 50,000 in 1910. Mean wages in dollars per day. Standard deviations in
parentheses. Mean wages are averages of city averages, not weighted by population. See text and appendix B for explanation
and sources of the city categories; see appendix A for other variables. The regional classifications are the standard Census
classifications.
*The full sample contains 106 cities. Philadelphia, a machine dominated city, did not report wages of municipal workers and
hence is excluded from this table and from the analysis of daily wages (table 2). Philadelphia is included in the analysis of city
budgets, but three small “not categorized” cities, one in the Mid-Atlantic and two in the West South Central, did not report
complete budgetary information for the year 1905-1909 and are excluded from the city budget analysis (tables 3-6). Nineteen
cities did not report complete paving data and are excluded from the paving analysis (tables 7 and 8).42




Unskilled wage Sample Statistics
Mean dep. var.












Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Mean Std Dev
ln(population 1900) .0247 (.017) .016 (.020) 11.37 0.902




.238 ** (.110) .181 * (.109) 6.34 0.174
% employees of bakeries
who are adult males
-.248 (.157) -.170 (.162) 0.802 0.117
machine dominated ——— ——— .082 ** (.040) 0.232 0.423
political structure not
categorized
——— ——— .033 (.040) 0.595 0.491
New England .085 ** (.039) .094 ** (.038) 75 city-wage obs
East North Central -.008 (.032) -.007 (.031) 74 city-wage obs
West North Central .005 (.053) .012 (.053) 39 city-wage obs
Mountain .242 *** (.052) .226 *** (.047) 8 city-wage obs
Pacific .306 *** (.074) .320 *** (.074) 25 city-wage obs
South Atlantic -.123 * (.067) -.126 ** (.063) 33 city-wage obs
East South Central -.032 (.054) -.045 (.056) 24 city-wage obs
West South Central .091 (.062) .098 (.065) 15 city-wage obs
Refuse Collection -.012 (.015) -.012 (.015) 75 city-wage obs
Street Cleaning -.052 *** (.011) -.051 *** (.010) 100 city-wage obs
Street Sprinkling -.082 *** (.031) -.080 *** (.031) 13 city-wage obs
General Highway -.032 *** (.009) -.033 *** (.009) 100 city-wage obs
Constant -.959 (.601) -.618 (.615)
Notes: Sample of 388 observed wage rates in 105 cities in 1909. See text and appendix B for explanation and sources of the
city categories; see appendix A for other variables. Regression estimated using OLS and standard errors White-corrected for
city fixed effects. Mid Atlantic, with 95 city-wage observations, is the omitted region; general sewer service, with 100 city-wage
observations, is the omitted department. The regional classifications are the standard Census classifications.43
TABLE 3—AVERAGE MUNICIPAL SPENDING PER CAPITA, 1905-1909














































































































































Notes: 103 cities with population greater than 50,000 in 1910. Municipal spending averaged over 1905, 1907, and 1909. Infrast.
is an abbreviation for infrastructure. The categories are not exhaustive; see text. See text and appendix B for explanation and
sources of the city categories; see appendix A for other variables. The regional classifications are the standard Census
classifications.44




















Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Mean Std Dev
ln(population 1900) .198 *** (.029) .177 *** (.034) 11.37 0.907
ln(pop1910/pop1900) .049 (.163) .106 (.163) 0.358 0.242
ln(land/pop) in 1900 .106 ** (.046) .112 ** (.045) -9.21 0.740
ln(land1909/land1900) .217 ** (.090) .212 ** (.089) 0.174 0.305
% pop age 10+ employed in
mfg
-.974 *** (.360) -.941 *** (.355) 0.172 0.096
% foreign born
a -.032 (.214) -.006 (.211) 0.343 0.151
% native born with foreign
parents
a
.360 (.396) .210 (.396) 0.236 0.076
machine dominated ——— ——— .183 ** (.082) 24 cities
political structure not
categorized
——— ——— .074  (.068) 61 cities
New England .172 ** (.081) .169 ** (.081) 19 cities
East North Central -.078 (.069) -.073 (.068) 21 cities
West North Central -.133 (.104) -.137 (.103) 9 cities
Mountain .086 (.185) .033 (.184) 2 cities
Pacific .334 ** (.144) .324 ** (.142) 6 cities
South Atlantic -.080 (.106) -.064 (.104) 8 cities
East South Central -.306 *** (.114) -.313 *** (.113) 6 cities
West South Central -.394 *** (.144) -.363 ** (.149) 4 cities
Constant 1.78 *** (.504) 2.00 *** (.563)
a among white males age 21+
Notes: 103 cities with population greater than 50,000 in 1910. All spending is expressed as the log of the average of per capita
spending in 1905, 1907, and 1909. The Mid Atlantic, with 28 cities, is the omitted region. See text and appendix B for political
categories and appendix A for sources of other variables. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at at least the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Land area is expressed as the log of per capita area,
measured in thousands of acres. The regional classifications are the standard Census classifications.45
TABLE 5—REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AVERAGE PER CAPITA CURRENT EXPENSES BY DEPARTMENT: 1905 AND 1907




































Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
ln(population 1900) .251 *** .039 .185 *** .029 .288 *** .049 .137 *** .036 .103 .062
ln(pop1910/pop1900) .239  .216 .165 .161 .447 .272 .214 .199 -.153 .352
ln(land/pop) in 1900 .001 .061 .043 .045 .046 .076 .155 *** .056 -.047 .098
ln(land 1909/land 1900) .237 * .120 .055 .089 .167 .151 -.027 .110 .020 .199
% pop age 10+ employed in
mfg
-1.00 ** .478 -1.26 *** .356 -.614 .601 -.334 .441 .147 .772
% foreign born among .289 .284 .168 .212 -.221 .358 -.047 .262 -.083 .458
% native born with foreign
born parents
1.28 ** .526 .899 ** .391 1.60 ** .662 .645 .485 .028 .845
machine dominated ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ———
political structure not
categorized
——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ———
(Continued on next page)46











Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
New England .266 ** .108 .304 *** .080 .449 *** .136 .482 *** .099 .175 .173
East North Central -.191 ** .092 -.011 .068 -.163 .116 -.118 .085 .029 .148
West North Central -.210 .138 -.098 .103 -.341 * .174 .036 .128 .066 .223
Mountain .759 *** .246 -.323 * .183 .027 .309 .021 .226 .536 .395
Pacific -.137 .192 -.211 .143 -.278 .241 -.092 .177 .353 .308
South Atlantic .097 .140 .175 * .104 .556 *** .177 .127 .129 -1.35 *** .225
East South Central -.469 *** .151 -.162 .112 -.112 .190 -.093 .139 -.505 * .255
West South Central -.156 .191 -.338 ** .142 -.117 .240 -.108 .176 -.283 .307
Constant -3.26 *** .669 -.882 * .498 -3.36 *** .843 .020 .617 -.269 1.09
a among white males 21+
Notes: 103 cities with population greater than 50,000 in 1900. All spending is expressed as the log of the average of per capita spending by department in 1905 and 1907. The Mid Atlantic, with 28
cities, is the omitted region. See text and appendix B for political categories and appendix A for other variables. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from
zero at at least the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Land area is expressed as the log of per capita area, measured in thousands of acres. Sample statistics presented in table 4. The
regional classifications are the standard Census classifications.47
TABLE 6—REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AVERAGE PER CAPITA CURRENT EXPENSES BY DEPARTMENT




































Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
ln(population 1900) .194 *** .043 .158 *** .033 .274 *** .057 .128 *** .042 .082 .073
ln(pop1910/pop1900) .329 .208 .217 .160 .517 * .276 .221 .205 -.226 .359
ln(land/pop) in 1900 .016 .058 .050 .044 .050 .077 .157 *** .057 -.042 .099
ln(land 1909/land 1900) .231 ** .114 .051 .087 .161 .151 -.027 .112 .028 .199
% pop age 10+ employed in
mfg
-.959 ** .454 -1.23 *** .349 -.567 .603 -.332 .446 .083 .776
% foreign born .328 .270 .192 .208 -.188 .359 -.044 .266 -.122 .461
% native born with foreign
born parents
1.03 ** .507 .754 * .390 1.43 ** .673 .619 .498 .180 .862
machine dominated .339 *** .105 .186 ** .080 .198 .139 .039 .103 -.130 .178
political structure not
categorized
.078 .087 .055 .067 .112 .115 -.001 .085 -.182 .147
(Continued on next page)48
TABLE 6 (CONT.)











Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
New England .272 *** .103 .305 *** .079 .439 *** .137 .485 *** .101 .203 .176
East North Central -.190 ** .088 -.009 .067 -.155 .116 -.119 .086 .013 .149
West North Central -.221 * .131 -.104 .101 -.344 * .174 .034 .129 .063 .224
Mountain .648 *** .235 -.382 ** .181 -.023 .312 .006 .231 .543 .400
Pacific -.154 .182 -.221 .140 -.289 .241 .094 .179 .361 .309
South Atlantic .124 .133 .191 * .102 .575 *** .177 .130 .131 -1.36 *** .227
East South Central -.496 *** .144 -.173 .111 -.112 .191 -.099 .142 -.531 ** .258
West South Central -.144 .190 -.322 ** .146 -.060 .252 -.114 .187 -.403 .324
Constant -2.60 *** .720 -.574 .554 -3.27 *** .956 .140 .708 .176 1.23
a among white males 21+
Notes: 103 cities with population greater than 50,000 in 1900. All spending is expressed as the log of the average of per capita spending by department in 1905 and 1907. The
Mid Atlantic, with 28 cities, is the omitted region. See text and appendix B for city political categories and appendix A for other variables. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that
the coefficient is significantly different from zero at at least the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Land area is expressed as the log of per capita area, measured in
thousands of acres. Sample statistics presented in table 4. The regional classifications are the standard Census classifications49
TABLE 7—REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AVERAGE PROPORTION OF STREETS PAVED WITH DURABLE PAVING, 1903-1909
POLITICAL STRUCTURE DUMMIES NOT INCLUDED
(1)


































Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
ln(population 1900) .154*** .024 .126*** .034 .134*** .034 .136*** .047
ln(pop 1910/ pop 1900) –.003 .071 -.003 .158 .009 .070 .046 .162
ln(land in 1909) .110*** .022 -.093*** .032 -.104*** .022 -.093*** .032
ln(annual wages of bakery
employees)
-.007 .092 .238 .166 .008 .090 .245 .173
% foreign born -.173 .108 -.191 .155 -.150 .108 -.219 .161
% native born with foreign born
parents
.317 .206 .419 .276 .402* .221 .600* .308
constant -1.23** .589 -2.50** .989 -1.16* .595 -2.71** 1.03
Notes: All cities indicates all cities with population above 50,000 in 1907 for which paving data is available. Medium sized cities indicates cities with population between 50,000
and 300,000 in 1907 for which paving data is available. Land Area in 1000s of acres.50
TABLE 8—REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AVERAGE PROPORTION OF STREETS PAVED WITH DURABLE PAVING, 1903-1909
POLITICAL STRUCTURE DUMMIES INCLUDED
(1)

































Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
ln(population 1900) .116*** .026 .094*** .034 .089** .035 .108** .046
ln(pop 1910/ pop 1900) -.022 .071 .031 .150 -.025 .069 .089 .152
ln(area in 1909) -.105*** .021 -.089*** .030 -.097*** .021 -.094*** .031
ln(annual wages of bakery
employees)
.019 .090 .231 .161 .037 .087 .217 .163
% foreign born -.142 .105 -.130 .148 -.127 .102 -.136 .155
% native w/ foreign parents .219 .203 .291 .267 .337 .216 .503 .298
machine dominated .112*** .040 .113** .046 .110*** .038 .106** .045
Political structure categorized:
NO machine present
.067 .041 .104* .056 .074* .042 .108* .064
constant -.999 .583 -2.15** .984 -.867 .575 -2.28 .987
Notes: Cities with population above 50,000 in 1907 and surviving paving data. Medium sized cities indicates cities with population between 50,000 and 300,000 in 1907 for
which paving data is available. Area in 100,000 acres. Note change from previous specification, the omitted category is the politically unknown cities.51
APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES
The sample of 103 cities analyzed is fundamentally the list of all cities with population greater than 50,000 in the 1910
Census of Population. Both samples omit Washington, DC and San Francisco. San Francisco is dropped because of
the impact of the earthquake in 1906 on observed city characteristics, both population and finances.
Variable Source Notes




See text. coded 1 if political history not discovered, 0 if city is




See text and appendix B. coded 1 if a political history was found and there was
no evidence of machine domination.
City population in 1900 12th Census: 1900 vol. 1 Log of the population in 1900 is used in the
regression analysis.
City population in 1910 13th Census: 1910 vol. 1 Log difference of population in 1910 and 1900 is
used in the regression analysis.
land area in 1900 Statistics of Cities: 1905  The log of the land area in thousands of acres per
capita is used in the regression analysis.
land area in 1909 Financial Statistics of Cities:
1909
The log difference of land area in 1909 and in 1900
is used in the regression analysis.
% population aged 10 and
older employed in
manufacturing in 1910
13th Census: 1910 vol. 4 Tables III and IV list occupations of population by
city. Robert Whaples generously provided the data
in machine readable format.
% foreign born among
white males 21+
12th Census: 1900 vol.1 Proportion of foreign born among white males age
21 or older.
% native born with foreign
parents among white males
21+
12th Census: 1900 vol.1 Proportion of native born with foreign parents among
white males age 21 or older.
Annual wages of bakery
employees
13th Census: 1910 vol.9 Total costs and average employment by industry are
reported for cities with populations greater than
50,000. Tables in source are arranged by state. The
log of the average annual wages per employee is
used in the regression analysis.
% employees of bakeries
who are adult males.
13th Census: 1910 vol.9 See above notes.Variable Source Notes
52
Region The 9 standard Census
classifications.
Cities are found in the following states:
New England: CT, MA, ME, NH, RI
Mid Atlantic: NJ, NY, PA
East North Central: IL, IN, MI, OH, WI
West North Central: IA, KS, MN, MO, NE
Mountain: CO, MT, UT
Pacific: CA, OR, WA
South Atlantic: DE, FL, GA, MD, SC, VA, WV
East South Central: AL, KY, TN
West South Central: AR, LA, OK, TX.
Daily municipal wages of
unskilled laborers.
General Statistics of Cities:
1909




Statistics of Cities: 1905 
Statistics of Cities: 1907
Financial Statistics of Cities:
1909
Log of the average of 1905, 1907 and 1909 per





Statistics of Cities: 1905
Statistics of Cities: 1907
Log of the average of 1905 and 1907 per capita
current expenses for general administration is used




Statistics of Cities: 1905
Statistics of Cities: 1907
Log of the average of 1905 and 1907 per capita
current expenses for police, fire, and other protection





Statistics of Cities: 1905
Statistics of Cities: 1907
Log of the average of 1905 and 1907 per capita





Statistics of Cities: 1905
Statistics of Cities: 1907
Log of the average of 1905 and 1907 per capita
current expenses for streets, sidewalks, bridges, etc.




Statistics of Cities: 1905
Statistics of Cities: 1907
Log of the average of 1905 and 1907 per capita
current expenses for education is used in the
regression analysis.
Proportion of streets paved
with durable paving in
1909.
General Statistics of Cities:
1909
Paved streets are measured by the mile. As wider
streets were more likely to be paved, the proportion
of street area paved is probably somewhat higher.
Notes: All cited sources are U.S. Bureau of the Census publications and are listed in the References under the
authorship of the U.S. Bureau of the Census.53
APPENDIX B: SHORT POLITICAL HISTORIES OF MACHINE AND NON-MACHINE DOMINATED CITIES
TABLE B-1—NON-MACHINE CITIES
City Political History Source
Atlanta GA Municipal politics overshadowed by state politics.
No home rule. No machine
Buenker and Kantowicz
1988
Birmingham AL Never a machine city. Political competition
between largely German-American ethnics and
native whites.
Harris 1977
Buffalo NY Politics dominated by German Americans.
Elections fought on issues, not by organizations.
Goldman 1983
Butte MT Politics dominated by Anaconda Copper. Gimpel 1994
Dallas TX Adopted city manager system in 1907. No
machine politics evident.
Stone, Price and Stone 1940
Des Moines IA One of the first cities to adopt the Commission
form of Government, in 1907. Not a machine
before reform or after.
Rice 1977
Detroit MI One of the first Progressive mayors, Pingree, in
the 1890s. Business reform movement led by
Leland, President of Cadillac, c. 1910.
Elenbaas 1974
Holli and Jones 1981
Fall River MA Irish Democrats fail to organize. Republicans,
with French Canadian, English, and native born
Protestant support, dominated politics; distributed
little patronage to these groups, not a machine.
Silvia 1973
Galveston TX Commission government form invented in early
1900s, following physical destruction of city in a
hurricane. Never a machine. 
Rice 1977
Harrisburg PA State capital. Politics dominated by state politics
and local businessmen.
Eggert 1993
Houston TX Active reform politics. One of the first cities to
adopt the Commission form of government.
Rice 1977
Indianapolis IN Local political competition lively and corruption is




City Political History Source
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Los Angeles CA Active reform politics. Many popular structural
reforms passed.
Holli and Jones 1981
Buenker and Kantowicz
1988
Milwaukee WI In 1910 Milwaukee elects a Socialist mayor who
remains in office through end of period.
Booth 1985
Passaic NJ Business elites defeat emerging Irish machine in
the 1910s.
Ebner 1972
San Antonio TX Machine politics in 1880s and 1890s, but
machine defeated by 1900-1920. German and
Mexican American coalition had succumbed to
influx of native white voters. The boss, Bryan
Callaghan, remains an important political figure,
but without a machine.
Baum and Miller 1993
San Francisco CA Machine politics in 1880s and 1890s, but
machine falls after death of the “blind boss”
Buckley. Abraham Ruef, although corrupt, fails to





Seattle WA Borderline case. Hiram Gill has boss-like
characteristics, but fails to build lasting party
hierarchy. Union politics important.
Berner 1991
Blackford 1968
Toledo OH Toledo's mayor in the 1890s, Samuel "Golden
Rule" Johnson, left a strong tradition of socially
responsible reform government.
Stinchcombe 1968
Wilmington DE Government dominated by local business
leaders. DuPont headquarters established in
Wilmington during the period. 
Hoffecker 1983
Notes: All references refer to sources listed in the References.55
TABLE B-2—MACHINE CITIES
City Political History Source
Albany NY Controlled by a Republican machine 1900-1920. In
1920 the Democratic O'Connell machine took over,
controlled Albany until the 1980s.
Robinson 1977
Baltimore MD Democratic machine. Boss Rasin died in 1911.
"Sonny" Mahon succeeded Rasin. Machine not
completely dominant; neither Rasin nor Mahon were




Boston MA 1900-1910 dominated by the rival machine
organizations of John "Honey Fitz" Fitzgerald and
Martin "Mahatma" Lomasney. 1910-1920 dominated
by machine rivalry between "Honey Fitz" and James
Curley.
Holli and Jones 1981
Chicago IL Machine present but formed alliances, such as with
reform mayor Carter Harrison II. The monolithic
Democratic Chicago machine was established by
Czermack c.1930.
Forthal 1946
Cincinnati OH Republican machine controls c.1900-1925. Survived
indictment of boss George B. Cox in 1910. Finally
defeated in elections in 1925. Similar to Denver and
Grand Rapids, machine adopted Progressive
measures to garner political support.
Buenker and Kantowicz
1988
Cleveland OH Home of famous reform mayor, Democrat Tom
Johnson, 1901-1909, but Republican machine,
headed by Maurice Maschke, controlled city council
c.1910-1919, with German-American support.
Holli and Jones 1981
DiGaetano 1991
Dayton OH Republican Boss "Doc" Lowes and Democratic Boss
Hanley vie to control city c. 1890-1914. Machines
permanently defeated in 1914. Reform movement led
by president of National Cash Register. Rise of
Socialist party weakened machine working class
support.
Sealander 1988TABLE B-2—MACHINE CITIES
City Political History Source
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Denver CO 1904-1918 run by the relatively Progressive Boss
Speer, who used patronage, support for infrastructure,
and efficient government to tie together a coalition of
urban poor and elites. One brief reform administration
in 1914. Speer dies in 1918.
Dorsett 1976
Grand Rapids MI Boss Mayor Ellis controlled Grand Rapids from 1906
until his death in 1916. Ellis built a coalition of
machine elements and reform policies, similar to
Mayor Speer in Denver.
Travis 1974
Hoboken NJ A classic machine with strong ties to the Irish
American community.
Foster and Clark 1976
Jersey City NJ During most of this period the political machine faced
strong opposition from reform politicians. Only after
structural election reform in 1917 did the ironclad
dominance of Boss Frank "I am the Law" Hague
emerge.
Foster 1968
Kansas City MO Boss Pendergast controlled Kansas City from before




Louisville KY Machine control in Louisville ended in 1938 with the
death of the last citywide boss, Mike Brennan.
Boulay and DiGaetano
1985
Lowell MA A classic machine with strong ties to the Irish
American community.
Blewett 1976
Memphis TN Boss Crump built support for a machine out of a




New Orleans LA State government supported machine. Boss
Behrman's machine combined spending on public
goods such as roads and education, and mass transit




New York NY Tammany Hall, the most famous machine of all, ruled
New York under the direction of Boss Francis Murphy.
Weiss 1968TABLE B-2—MACHINE CITIES
City Political History Source
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Omaha NE Boss Dennison controlled the city 1900-mid 1920s.
The Dennison machine was one of the most openly
criminal machines in the nation.
Menard 1989
Peoria IL The machine of "Old Ed" Woodruff emerged before
1910 and dominated Peoria politics until 1946.
Boulay and DiGaetano
1985
Philadelphia PA A Republican machine with ties to state boss Bois
Penrose. Close ties to business interests; cited by







Pittsburgh PA A Republican machine closely allied with business. Buenker and Kantowicz
1988
Rochester NY A Republican machine. Boulay and DiGaetano
1985
St Louis MO Borderline machine. After defeat of Boss Butler in
1902, State level Democratic party probably ran a
machine under Rolla Wells in 1900s. Machine politics
clearly re-emerges in 1910s and Boss Hannegan is




Utica NY A Republican machine supported by Utica's large
Italian American community and a rival Irish political
establishment.
Bean 1994
Notes: All references refer to sources listed in the References.